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Abstract

The Napster – Bertelsmann deal has made it obvious. Even the music industry itself does not believe in the
traditional business model for distributing music anymore. But it was not the industry that came up with a
feasible alternative. It was Napster that developed the technology to distribute music online. Will the small
company now be able to build a sustainable business model upon its technology? From an economist’s point
of view, the question addresses the properties of music as an information good itself. The Internet has not
changed these properties, but it has unleashed some economies that had always been there.
This paper analyzes Napster’s potential to build a successful business model from an economic perspective
using standard concepts of institutional economics. A business model is defined as ”an architecture for the
product, service and information flows, including a description of the various business actors and their roles;
and a description of the potential benefits for the various business actors; and a description of the sources of
revenues” (Timmers, 1998, p. 4). We first give a summary of Napster’s case and then analyze the situation
using the concepts of transaction costs, property rights and network externalities. The first two categories were
chosen, because they illustrate the changes in the two main branches of the music industry’s value system:
production/distribution and property rights (Schmid, 2001). The third concept allows us to show Napster’s
comparative advantage over imitators. The paper ends with the discussion of further economic consequences
for the music industry and the future of Internet business models like file sharing.

The Case of Napster
Napster was founded by college freshman Shawn Fanning in May 1999. The company wanted to offer a product that combines
the advantages of encoding music files on a computer in MP3-format with exchanging them over the Internet using an interface
just as user-friendly as the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) (Internet Relay Chat, 2001). ”Napster” was Fanning’s nickname in the IRC.
Today, Napster, Inc. employs 50 staff and has attracted a professional management team (Napster, 2001).
The company runs a customer-to-customer community using a peer-to-peer architecture of more than 60 million members as of
today, who can currently share mp3 files without transaction costs other than paying for their ISP and the opportunity costs of
their time. Napster does so by offering a server with information about the community and a directory of all songs that can be
copied from other participants. In late 1999, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) put the company to court
for copyright infringements – a position that was confirmed in the court’s March 6 th, 2001 ruling that Napster has to eliminate
all copyrighted material from its server within 72 hours after notification by the right holders. While opponents of the service
claim that this is not sufficient – file names can be changed easily – supporters fear a breakdown of the community as the number
of songs available will shrink significantly. In any case: Napster is in dear need of a new business model. Our analysis focuses
on several microeconomic aspects, because making use of cost differentials and reaching more utility are the final motivation for
any economic agent to pay a company.

Transaction Costs
The most significant element from an economist’s point of view is a consequence of the technical architecture: encoding songs
digitally and sending them over the Internet splits up the junction of music and its physical medium. There is no further a technical
necessity to buy a physical good (a CD) to get the music. And this translates directly into lower transaction costs for three reasons:
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If the product is redefined to be music instead of a CD, the production and distribution of compact disks can be analyzed as
transaction costs on the producer’s side that only arise in the traditional music industry.
Distribution costs on the demand side can be reduced as buyers do not have to go downtown, find parking and buy a CD.
There is even an advantage compared to online stores like amazon.com as the product can be delivered (downloaded)
instantly.
Search costs (time and money) for consumers are greatly reduced as they get recommendations online and can usually
download a file directly – even special interest songs that are hard to get in most record stores.
And there is an additional argument that is often ignored: Napster is a neutral platform, where people feel save and have the
same spirit of changing files through the web. It is quite reasonable, that a service from one specific music company would
not be as successful, because the people would most probably fear to be misused for other purposes e.g. acquiring user
profiles and advertising. This argument goes back to the first ideas of transaction cost from Williamson, who criticized
economics for assuming rational expectations and described the importance of the transaction atmosphere for the signing of
a contract as a means to save on transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).
These insights into the future of file-sharing business models are not new but hardly ever mentioned as transaction costs in
the context of the World Wide Web are usually analyzed within the search phase only. As Williamson and later Picot describe
the process of transaction more detailed, it has four phases, from search up to fulfillment (Williamson, 1985; Picot, 1991).
Transaction costs arise in every phase throughout the process – and can potentially be reduced using a business model that
builds on Internet based distribution of music or any other information good.

Property Rights
To state it right at the beginning: The actual property rights of music did not change. It had always been legal to copy a CD for
private reasons (within sensible limits) and illegal to do it out of commercial interest. But mp3 and the Internet technology make
it very hard to distinguish a legal copy for private use and an illegal one, that is essentially traded for another file such violating
copyright law. The problem is even more severe, because many people’s concept of property and exclusive access to it rests on
the implicit assumption that property has a physical dimension that establishes a natural limit of use due to ”rivalry” (a single
economic good can only be used by one/few person(s) at a time). As music files can easily be copied, people may tend to think
that nobody is harmed by exchanging files. As prosecuting millions of users is out of question, file-sharing does in essence carve
a loophole into the judicial system and may destroy the otherwise working business model of the music industry.
As Schumpeter described it, this creative destruction does certainly support the development of new business models (Schumpeter,
1942). When the German media company Bertelsmann invested a substantial amount in Napster’s operations in October 2000,
it might have been the outcome of a rational optimization over two options: either continue to fight the technological development
in court and by developing ever stronger methods of encryption or tie with the opponent who still ”owns” the single biggest
community of music fans in the world. This $50Mio.-Dollar-bet might still be a bargain, if Bertelsmann and Napster succeed in
keeping the community while transforming the system towards a club model.
On a deeper level, the idea of file sharing comes very close to the basic idea of the property rights theory that analyzes an
exchange of goods as an exchange of property rights (Alchian/Demsetz, 1973; Furobotn/ Pejovich, 1972). Two elements are
especially interesting in this context: The first one comes back to the ”Tragedy of the Commons” as Hardin described it (1968).
The second one aims at incentives: Where can the economic motivation of the music industry for further production can come
from, if the property rights can not be secured (Bakos et al., 1999; Takeyama, 1997)?

Network Externalities
The earlier effects could be copied by new competitors, but we must not forget that Napster could attract a community of up to
60 million users. It shows all advantages of a distributed system while still allowing for control over the central server – the scarce
resource that enables its operator to charge for his service. Each user who downloads a music file is usually offering the files he
has already downloaded in the past for an upload. This means that every new user in the system does not only generate utility for
himself, but his presence also generates a rise in welfare for all other members of the community. In consequence, Napster can
offer the greatest number of songs for a download, which leads de facto to a monopoly position in the market as smaller
competitors cannot offer a competitive service at the same costs.
Although Napster’s service has lost some appeal since banned songs had to be eliminated from its directory, it is still a good
example for a business model that could generate significant profits based on networks externalities, both direct and indirect ones
(Katz/ Shapiro, 1985 and 1994). Napster’s network could also offer a very promising subject to study the theory of an optimal
mass of users (Hayashi, 1992; Noam, 1992; Mason/Varian, 1994). Napster managed it to gain the minimum number of people
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quite fast. Today it has the opposite problem as the network might have grown beyond the point of optimal economic use for the
individual participant.

Conclusion
In essence, Napster could build a successful business model based to its three essential advantages: First, its capability to isolate
the economic good (music) from its physical container (CD) puts the existing business model of the music industry in question:
Existing copyrights are hard to enforce. This leaves room for new entrants like Napster to join the market and offer a new style
of making revenue, namely a subscription system. Second, consumers tend to appreciate the service, because it is significantly
cheaper due to its peer-to-peer technology: The transaction costs are lower as there is no need for the production and distribution
of a physical good. Third, the perceived value is higher, because Napster can offer the advantages of a vivid community, and the
number of songs rises with each additional member: Any music company can reduce transaction costs by copying Napster, but
the network externality argument favors the pioneer. The biggest community wins. This was the reason for Bertelsmann to make
the first move and declare its strategic alliance with Napster.
We believe that Napster has a great potential, if it is managed right and the new business model follows the economic logic
outlined above: Cutting out other intermediaries can result in substantial cost savings, and community size does matter. However,
we do see substantial obstacles, too. The music industry, at least the ”big five” record labels Universal, EMI, Sony, BMG, and
Warner, form a powerful oligopoly. Any legal file sharing community will have to secure deals with all five companies to offer
a truly attractive catalogue and all companies would prefer to have a financial stake in the successful new intermediary. They
might use Napster’s obligation to eliminate copyrighted material to destroy the community before the new subscription model
is in place and build a new community of their own. However, recent numbers indicate only a limited drop in demand for
Napster’s services. But even if these institutional obstacles can be overcome, it still remains to be seen, if consumers are actually
willing to pay for a Napster service that used to be free. Alternative free communities and software products like Gnutella,
Napigator, Aimster or WinMX are already in place. And on some, you can share much more than mp3 encoded music.
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